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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Edward L. Comer appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdicts finding him guilty of two counts of sexual abuse against K.F. (Docket No. 
43718) and one count of sexual abuse against S.S. (Docket No. 43719).  Comer 
contends the district court erred in consolidating the three sexual abuse charges 
for trial.   
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
In Bannock County Case No. CR-2013-12297-FE (Docket No. 43718), the 
state charged Comer with two counts of sexual abuse involving K.F.  (R., pp.43-
44, 68-69, 301-302, 443-445.)  The state filed two notices of intent to introduce 
evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) – one based on contact Comer had with L.H., 
and one based on contact Comer had with S.S.  (R., pp.108-109, 186-187.)  The 
allegations involving S.S. were also the subject of sexual abuse charges in 
Bannock County Case No. CR-2014-13664-FE (Docket No. 43719).  (R., pp.538-
539, 583-584.)  In K.F.’s case, the district court excluded evidence related to the 
alleged contact with L.H., but granted the motion with respect to S.S. 
(R., pp.200-210, 280-290.) 
The state also filed an I.R.E. 404(b) motion in S.S.’s case, seeking to 
introduce the evidence of sexual abuse of K.F. (R., pp.603-604.)  The district 
court granted that motion on the same bases it granted the motion in K.F.’s case.  
(Tr., p.71, L.9 – p.72, L.18.)  S.S.’s case proceeded to trial on April 7, 2015. 
(R., pp.745-746.)  In that case, the jury acquitted Comer of one count of sexual 
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abuse, but was unable to reach a verdict on the other count.  (R., p.747.)  As a 
result, the state moved to consolidate K.F.’s case and S.S.’s case.  (R., p.391.)  
The court granted the motion over Comer’s objection.  (R., p.344; Tr., p.134, 
Ls.8-14.)  At the consolidated trial, the jury found Comer guilty of both counts of 
sexual abuse involving K.F., and the one count of sexual abuse involving S.S.  
(R., pp.478-479, 791.)  The court imposed concurrent unified 10-year sentences, 
with four years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.1  (R., pp.509-511, 802-806.)  
Comer filed a timely notice of appeal in both cases.  (R., pp.515-517, 810-812.)     
 
 
                                                 




Comer states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err when it determined through Rule 404(b) 
motions that the allegations in these two cases constituted a 
common scheme or plan, and by joining the cases on that basis? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.4.) 
 
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Has Comer failed to show error in the district court’s determination that 
consolidation of the two sexual abuse cases was appropriate given that the 
cases had common elements, similar circumstances, and victims of the same 
age, and given the overlapping evidence, including that evidence of both victims’ 









 Comer contends “the district court erred by determining in the Rule 404(b) 
motions that the allegations in these two cases constituted a common scheme or 
plan and then by joining the cases on that basis.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)  To the 
contrary, a review of the record shows no error in the district court’s decision to 
consolidate Dockets Nos. 43718 and 43719.  Specifically, consolidation of the 
two sexual abuse cases was appropriate given that the cases had common 
elements, similar circumstances, and victims of the same age, and given the 
overlapping evidence, including that evidence of both victims’ abuse would be 
admissible at separate trials.  Even if Comer has met his burden of showing error 
in relation to the consolidation, any error is harmless.      
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“Whether a court improperly joined offenses pursuant to I.C.R. 8 is a 
question of law, over which this Court exercises free review.”  State v. Field, 
144 Idaho 559, 564, 165 P.3d 273, 278 (2007) (citations omitted).  “In contrast, 
an abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the denial of a motion 
to sever joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 14; however, that rule presumes joinder was 
proper in the first place.”  Id.    
Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: 
whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given 
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the 
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evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 
1185, 1187 (2009).   
 
C. Consolidation Of The Two Sexual Abuse Cases Was Appropriate Given 
That The Cases Had Common Elements, Similar Circumstances, And 
Victims Of The Same Age, And Given The Overlapping Evidence, 
Including That Evidence Of Both Victims’ Abuse Would Be Admissible At 
Separate Trials 
  
“Joinder of offenses is permissible if those offenses ‘could have been 
joined in a single complaint, indictment or information.’”  Field, 144 Idaho at 565, 
165 P.3d at 279 (quoting I.C.R. 13).  “Two (2) or more offenses may be charged 
on the same complaint, indictment or information and a separate count for each 
offense, if the offenses charged are based on . . . two (2) or more acts or 
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or 
plan.”  I.C.R. 8(a).  “Whether joinder is proper is ‘determined by what is alleged, 
not what the proof eventually shows.’”  Field, 144 Idaho at 565, 165 P.3d at 279 
(quoting State v. Cochran, 97 Idaho 71, 73, 539 P.2d 999, 1001 (1975)).  “Cases 
discussing common plans have focused on whether the offenses were one 
continuing action or whether the offenses have sufficient common elements 
including the type of sexual abuse, the circumstances under which the abuse 
occurred, and the age of the victims.”  Field, 144 Idaho at 565, 165 P.3d at 279.  
Other cases “discuss whether evidence regarding other sex crimes would be 
admissible in a trial to prove a common plan.”  Id. at 566, 165 P.3d at 280 
(citations omitted).  The Supreme Court “has long recognized that joint trials 
conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, 
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and avoid delays in bringing those accused to trial.  Rule 8 accommodates these 
interests while protecting against prejudicial joinder.”  United States v. Lane, 
474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986) (quotations and citation omitted); see also State v. 
Anderson, 138 Idaho 359, 361-362, 63 P.3d 485, 487-488 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(noting timing of offenses, location of offenses, and “overlapping evidence” as 
considerations relevant to joinder). 
Following the first trial in S.S.’s case in which the jury was unable to reach 
a verdict on one of the sexual abuse charges, the state filed a motion to 
consolidate that charge with K.F.’s case.  (R., p.391.)  In its motion to 
consolidate, the state asserted “both cases are based on the same principles of 
law.”  (R., p.391.)  At the hearing on the motion, the prosecutor requested 
consolidation on the grounds that there was “essentially a huge overlap in what’s 
going on:  You’ve got the same defendant, a lot of the same witnesses, similar 
type of crime.”  (Tr., p.128, Ls.10-13.)  Comer objected, arguing that 
“consolidation would be extremely prejudicial,” and that “[t]he cases involve 
different victims and substantially different facts.”  (R., p.344.)  At the hearing, 
Comer repeated his concern that a consolidated trial would be “extremely 
prejudicial” despite the court’s I.R.E. 404(b) ruling allowing evidence of the abuse 
of both victims in both cases.  (Tr., p.132, L.1 – p.133, L.12.)  The court ruled: 
I do think that the best thing to do here is to consolidate these two 
cases.  I do think it’s the same witnesses.  It’s the same fact 
pattern.  It’s the same time, event.  I’m going to let the one victim, 
alleged victim, testify in the other case anyway because I’ve 
already made that ruling.  So I am going to consolidate the two 
cases.  
 
(Tr., p.134, Ls.8-14.)   
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 The district court’s decision to consolidate K.F.’s and S.S.’s cases is 
consistent with the requirements of I.C.R. 8 and with the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Field because the “offenses have sufficient common elements 
including the type of sexual abuse, the circumstances under which the abuse 
occurred, and the age of the victims.”  144 Idaho at 565, 165 P.3d at 279.  S.S. 
and K.F. both alleged that Comer touched their “vaginal area” and breasts while 
they were at Comer’s house, and both girls are the same age.  (R., pp.615-616; 
Affidavit of S.S. (augmentation).)  In fact, S.S. and K.F. were at Comer’s house 
working on a puzzle together the day Comer abused K.F.  (Id.)  Given these 
similarities, joinder was proper.  Field, supra.   
 On appeal, Comer “maintains that the court erred by determining that 
alleged offense offenses [sic] were part of a common plan or scheme,” and 
argues that “this case is controlled by the recent decision in State v. Orellana-
Castro, 158 Idaho 757[, 351 P.3d 1215] (2015).”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)  The 
issue in Orellana-Castro, however, was whether the district court erred in 
denying the defendant’s motion to sever.  158 Idaho 757, 351 P.3d 1215.  Thus, 
it is unclear why Comer believes Orellana-Castro, rather than Field, controls the 
joinder issue in this case.   
 In relying on Orellana-Castro, Comer notes that the Court in Orellana-
Castro “faulted the district court for failing to conduct the analysis mandated by 
the Court in State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49 (2009) and State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 
664 (2010),” with respect to finding a common scheme or plan and, he contends, 
those three cases collectively require this Court to reach the same result – “a 
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finding that the charges do not constitute a common scheme or plan.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-10.)  This argument ignores the Court’s basis for 
“fault[ing]” the district court for failing to conduct an I.R.E. 404(b) analysis in 
relation to Orellana-Castro’s motion to sever.   
 The state charged Orellana-Castro with two counts of sexual abuse and 
two counts of lewd conduct against one victim, and two counts of sexual abuse 
with respect to a second victim.  Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 759, 351 P.3d at 
1217.  Orellana-Castro filed a motion to sever on the grounds that the charges 
involving the two victims “occurred at different times and places, were totally 
unrelated, and were not part of a common scheme or plan.”  Id.  The district court 
denied the motion, finding “there was sufficient evidence to show that the alleged 
sex abuse crimes regarding the two girls were part of a common scheme or plan 
because the two girls were very close in age, both girls alleged abuse that 
occurred in the family home, and the alleged abuse all occurred during the period 
of 2010 to 2011.”  Id.   
 Addressing the severance issue, the Court explained: 
When the defendant moves for severance under Criminal Rule 14, 
the alleged prejudice is often that evidence of the defendant’s 
conduct which would be admissible in the prosecution of one 
offense would not be admissible under Evidence Rule 404(b) in the 
prosecution of the other offense if it were tried separately.  In that 
circumstance, the analysis is the same as to whether the 
offenses are part of a common scheme or plan permitting 
joinder under Criminal Rule 8(a) and whether the defendant 
would be prejudiced by joinder because the offenses were not 
part of a common scheme or plan under Evidence Rule 404(b).  
 
Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 760, 351 P.3d at 1218 (emphasis added).   
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 It was in this context that the Court “fault[ed]” the district court for failing to 
conduct an analysis pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) because Orellana-Castro “argued 
that the offenses allegedly committed against both girls were not part of a 
common scheme or plan and that the evidence admissible regarding the offense 
allegedly committed against one girl would not be admissible under Evidence 
Rule 404(b) regarding the offense allegedly committed against the other girl.”  
Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 761, 351 P.3d at 1219.  The same is not true in 
Comer’s case.  In fact, the opposite is true because Comer’s argument opposing 
joinder accepted the determination that Rule 404(b) evidence would be 
admissible at both trials.  (Tr., p.132, Ls.3-7, p.133, Ls.4-12.)  Comer succinctly 
stated his position as follows:  “[I]f you have 404(b) already, there’s no need to 
consolidate.”  (Tr., p.133, Ls.11-12.)  Because Comer’s objection to joinder was 
not based on I.R.E. 404(b), the analytical framework from Orellana-Castro does 
not control and, for the reasons stated, joinder was proper pursuant to the 
considerations articulated in Field.   
 Comer also appears to separately challenge the district court’s I.R.E. 
404(b) ruling, but only to the extent it was based on a finding of “common 
scheme or plan.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.11 (“the district court erred by finding 
evidence of a common scheme or plan at both the Rule 404(b) motions and in 
the motion to consolidate”).)  Comer does not challenge the district court’s 
conclusion that the evidence was also admissible to show absence of mistake or 
accident based on Comer’s claim that the touching occurred “accidentally” when 
he was teaching the girls defensive tactics.  (R., p.287; see Tr., p.62, Ls.11-12.)  
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While Comer is correct that “the standard for joining cases is not whether certain 
evidence would be admissible as absence of mistake,” because he does not 
claim that the evidence was not properly admitted for this purpose (Appellant’s 
Brief, p.11), he cannot ultimately show error in the district court’s I.R.E. 404(b) 
ruling.  State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ct. App. 
1998) (where a basis for a ruling by a district court is unchallenged on appeal, 
appellate court will affirm on the unchallenged basis).      
 Comer has also failed to show error in the court’s common scheme or plan 
determination.  Notably, unlike in Orellana-Castro, the district court specifically 
discussed Grist, supra, and Johnson, supra.  (R., pp.284-286.)  It also discussed 
the Court’s I.R.E. 404(b) ruling in State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 304 P.3d 276 (2013), 
as well as several other cases applying Rule 404(b) principles to cases involving 
sexual misconduct.  (R., pp.284-286.)  The district court correctly applied those 
principles to the evidence before it in concluding that evidence of K.F.’s abuse 
would be admissible at S.S.’s trial, and evidence of S.S.’s abuse would be 
admissible at K.F.’s trial based, in part, on the conclusion that the evidence 
showed a “common scheme or plan.”  (R., pp.280-290.)  Comer has failed to 
show otherwise.     
 Comer has failed to show error in the district court’s consolidation 




D. Even If This Court Concludes Comer Has Met His Burden Of Showing 
Error, Any Such Error Is Harmless 
 
Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”  I.C.R. 52.  
“[A]n error involving misjoinder ‘affects substantial rights’ and requires reversal 
only if the misjoinder results in actual prejudice because it had substantial and 
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”  Lane, 474 U.S. at 
449 (quotations and citation omitted).  Even if the district court erred in joining 
K.F.’s and S.S.’s cases for trial, the error did not have a substantial or injurious 
effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.2   
As noted, evidence of Comer’s abuse of both victims would have been 
admissible at separate trials even in the absence of a common scheme or plan 
because it would be properly admitted to refute Comer’s claim that the abusive 
touching occurred “accidentally” when he was teaching defensive tactics.  
Moreover, the court instructed the jury that it must “decide each count separately 
on the evidence and the law that applies to it, uninfluenced by your decision as to 
any other count.”  (R., p.720 (Instruction No. 3).)  “Idaho appellate courts . . . 
                                                 
2 Comer contends “it is impossible for the State to show that the district court’s 
error was harmless because the record already demonstrates that it is possible 
for a jury to come to a different conclusion where one of the alleged victims offers 
404(b) evidence” as demonstrated by the fact that the jury in S.S.’s first trial 
“acquitted [him] on one charge and failed to reach a conclusion on the other.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-12.)  The possibility that a jury could reach a “different 
conclusion” is not the standard for harmless error.  Nor does the existence of a 
“different conclusion” in a prior case foreclose a determination of harmless error 
in a subsequent case, particularly in the absence of any information as to why 
the jury reached a “different conclusion” in a prior case.  The standard for 
harmless error is correctly stated above and that standard must be applied to the 
trial that resulted in the convictions that are the subject of this appeal.          
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presume that a jury follows the instructions it is given.”  Joy, 155 Idaho at 7, 
304 P.3d at 282.  Any error in joining K.F.’s case and S.S.’s case was harmless.  
Compare Lane, 474 U.S. at 450 (noting “overwhelming evidence of guilt,” “a 
proper limiting instruction” “admonish[ing] the jury to consider each count and 
defendant separately,” and the fact that “the same evidence on Count 1 would 
likely have been admissible on joint retrial of Counts 2 through 6 to show 
[defendant’s] intent under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),” supported the 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
sentences entered upon the jury verdicts finding Comer guilty of three counts of 
sexual abuse. 




      __/s/ Jessica M. Lorello________ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO  
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